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Specht: State Taxation of Interstate Business: An End to the Privilage of

CASE COMMENTS
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE BUSINESS:
AN END TO THE PRIVILEGE TAX IMMUNITY*
Complete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Brady, 97 S.Ct. 1076 (1977)
Appellant, a Michigan corporation engaged in the business of transporting
motor vehicles by truck For General Motors,' brought suit2 seeking a refund
for a Mississippi tax levied on the "privilege of . . . doing business." 3 The

refund action, initiated in a Mississippi chancery court, 4 unsuccessfully
challenged the constitutionality of the tax as applied to an exclusively interstate business. s Appellant based his challenge solely on prior decisions of the
United States Supreme Court holding that a state tax on the privilege of
doing business is inapplicable to an activity that is part of interstate
commerce. 6 The Mississippi supreme court affirmed the lower court decision
which had upheld the tax assessments. 7 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed and HELD, that a tax levied on the privilege of doing business did
not per se violate the Constitution since the tax was nondiscriminatory, fairly
apportioned, and based on sufficient local activity." In reaching this decision
the Supreme Court explicitly overruled its prior holding in Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor.9
*EDITOR'S NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted in the Spring 1977 quarter.
1. General Motors maintains a plant in Georgia where automobiles are assembled
for shipment by railroad to Jackson, Mississippi. Appellant unloads the automobiles onto
an adjacent yard and delivers them to dealers at various locations within and without
Mississippi. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So. 2d 268, 269-70 (Miss. 1976).
2. Suit was brought pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. §27-65-47 (1972).
3. MISS. CODE ANN. §27-65-13 (1972): "There is hereby levied and assessed, and shall
be collected, privilege taxes for the privilege of engaging or continuing in business or
doing business within this state to be determined by the application of rates against
gross proceeds of sales or gross income or values, as the case may be, as provided in the
following sections."
4. The opinion of the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County,
Mississippi, is unreported.
5. 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1077-78 (1977). Appellant alleged that the tax violated the commerce
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. Id. at 1076-77.
The measure of the tax was determined by MISS. CODE ANN. §27-65-19(2) (1972): "Upon
every person operating a pipeline, railroad, airplane, bus, truck or any other transportation
business for the transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire between
points within this State, there is hereby levied, assessed, and shall be collected, a tax equal
to five percent (5%) of the gross income of such business. .. "
6. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. 249 (1946). For detailed discussion of these cases, see notes 35-43 infra and accompanying
text.
7. 330 So. 2d at 276.
8. 97 S.Ct. at 1084.
9. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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The commerce clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress
the power to regulate commerce among the several states.'0 The Supreme
Court has long interpreted the commerce clause as a restriction on state regulation as well as a grant of power to Congress." Thus, although the Court has
always recognized the states' inherent power to tax, as a form of regulation's
that power is subject to the commerce clause.' 3 In confronting the enduring
problem of whether a state tax is prohibited by the commerce clause, the
Supreme Court has taken various approaches 4 and produced a "quagmire"'
6
of inconsistently reasoned decisions.1
Initially, the Supreme Court took a firm stand against all state taxation
of interstate commerce' for two reasons: (1) state taxation might be burdensome or regulatory, in derogation of the power granted to Congress to
regulate interstate commerce,' 8 and (2) states lacked the power to tax a
privilege granted by the federal government.' 9 This line of reasoning remained
predominant for almost fifty years as the Supreme Court established an area
of interstate trade free of state license, 20 franchise,2' and privilege 22 taxes.
Recognizing the states' increasing need for revenue, 23 the Court eventually
discarded this rigid approach and adopted a direct-indirect test for determining
the constitutionality of a particular state tax.24 A tax directly affecting interstate commerce was held to impose an undue burden and was therefore unconstitutional. 25 States were allowed to levy those taxes that only indirectly

U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8, d.3.
11. Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. 232, 276 (1872).
12. Taxation is a form of regulation. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
365 (1819).
10.

13. "The power of taxation is indispensable to [the states'] existence .... But when a
state proceeds to regulate commerce ... among the several states, it is exercising the
very power that is granted to Congress.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
199 (1824) (quoting Marshall, C.J.).
14. See generally J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE

AND LOCAL TAXATION 163-69 (3d ed. 1969).
15. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
16. "This Court alone has handed down some three hundred full-dress opinions ...
mhe decisions have been 'not always clear . . .consistent or reconcilable.'" Id.at 457-58
(quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954)).
17. Case of State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873), marked the first decision

invalidating a state tax as violative of the commerce clause. Prior cases had either upheld
a tax alleged to violate the commerce clause or utilized other clauses to invalidate the
tax. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, at 163 n.4.
18. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).
19. Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. 232, 279 (1872).
20. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).
21. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 48 (1910).
22. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 499 (1887).
23.

Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Businesses: A More Liberal Trend, 36 U.

LA. L. REV. 304, 306 (1975).
24. See Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce -"Direct Burdens," "Multiple
Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. Rxv. 496, 497-506 (1951). See generally P. HARTMAN, STATE TAxATiON OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 28-33 (1953).

25. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 649 (1888) (invalidated a license tax im-

posed as a requisite to engagin& ininterstate business).
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affected interstate commerce.2 r This approach by the Court permitted some
state taxation of interstate commerce but maintained a nearly tax-immune
2 7
status for businesses engaged exclusively in trade across state lines.
The 1930's marked a new era in state taxation of interstate commerce as
the Supreme Court, with its decision in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
29
Revenue,28 developed the doctrine of multiple taxation. Insisting that inter-

state commerce should bear its fair share of the tax burden, 30 the Western
Live Stock Court permitted state taxation that was fairly apportioned to the
business carried on within the taxing state.3 1 Apportionment ensured that
an interstate business would not be subjected to multiple taxation by various
states for the same commercial activity. 2 Despite this more practical approach
to state taxation,3 3 the doctrine that no state could tax 34the privilege of
engaging in exclusively interstate business remained intact.
The pragmatic multiple tax approach pronounced in Western Live Stock
was continually undermined through the 1950's as the Court revitalized the
direct-indirect test. The reversion to the direct-indirect test began with
Freeman v. Hewit 35 in 1946 and reached its peak in Spector Motor Service,
26. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond. 249 U.S. 252, 261 (1919) (tax of two
dollars on each telegraph pole maintained in city streets by a company engaged in both
interstate and intrastate business held not to be a direct tax on interstate commerce).
27. Comment, Pipelines, Privileges and Labels: Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 70
Nw. U.L. REV. 835, 840 (1975).
28. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
29. Justice Stone spearheaded the development of this doctrine. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 14, at 166.
30. 303 U.S. at 254.
31. Id. at 260.
32. Acceptable methods of apportionment were those "reasonably designed to measure
the State's nexus with the receipts, income, or property taxed." J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note
14, at 166.
Thus. states often based their taxes on local incidents that would ordinarily be untaxable in other states. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) (declaration of corporate dividends held to be a local activity sufficient to support a gross receipts
tax); Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (sale of advertisement
space was sufficient to support a New Mexico gross receipts tax); Coverdale v. ArkansasLouisiana Pipeline Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938) (production of electric power was sufficient
local activity to support state tax). But see Norfolk 8&W.R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S.
114 (1890) (state license tax levied against a local office and staff was invalidated because
local activity merely facilitated the running of an interstate business).
33. A less practical approach, the direct-indirect burden approach, is aptly described
in P. HARTMAN, supra note 24, at 31-32: "This conceptual and unrealistic mode of
judicial thought gave very little consideration to the practical question of economic burden
of the tax."
34. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 88 (1948). Conversely, a state
franchise or excise tax on the use or investment of capital within the state was constitutional. Id. at 88-89.
35. 329 U.S. 249 (1946). The direct-indirect test was partially revitalized when the
Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, nullified an Indiana tax on gross proceeds
from a sale of stock on the New York Stock Exchange by a resident trustee through a
local broker. The tax levied on the sale was viewed as a direct burden on interstate
commerce. Id. at 257.
Freeman was refined within a year by Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330
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36
Inc. v. O'Connor.
In Spector the challenged Connecticut privilege tax 37 was
3s
nondiscriminatory and fairly apportioned, thus eliminating the possibility
of multiple taxation; 39 nevertheless, the Court held that state taxation of the
federal privilege of carrying on interstate commerce was constitutionally in-

firm.

0

While contending that the decision was not a matter of labels, 4 1 the

Spector Court based its holding on a slight variation in statutory language,
which was the only factor that distinguished the Connecticut tax from state
taxes previously upheld as constitutional.42 Under Spector the constitutionality
of a state tax could rest on the language used by state legislators drafting the
tax rather than on the economic burden imposed by that tax. 43
The landmark case of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota44 in 1959 ruled that the commerce clause did not prohibit a state
U.S. 422 (1947). The Court perpetuated the doctrine of Freeman that interstate commerce
is immune from direct taxation but professed to apply the multiple tax doctrine in doing
so. For a detailed discussion of the Freeman case, see Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on
Interstate Transactions, 47 COLUM. L. Rav. 211, 211-16 (1947).
The multiple tax doctrine was strengthened by Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335
U.S. 80, 88 (1947), in which Justice Reed, speaking for the Court, determined whether a
tax imposed a cumulative burden by asking whether the local activities taxed were an
integral part of carrying on interstate commerce. Id. at 93-96. Further, the majority disallowed taxation that, although based on local activity not connected with interstate
business, was discriminatory in nature and tended to favor local business. Id. at 90-91.
36. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. §418(c) (1935).
38. 340 U.S. at 607.
39. The tax thus satisfied the test set forth by Justice Reed in Memphis Natural Gas
Co., 835 U.S. at 88. See note 35 supra.
40. 340 U.S. at 609.
41. Id. at 608.
42. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 815 U.S. 649 (1942), upheld a Tennessee
net income tax having the same measure and economic effect on interstate commerce as the
Connecticut net income tax invalidated in Spector. The only difference between the two
taxes was their statutory language. Whereas Spector involved a tax on the privilege of
doing business, the Tennessee statute was worded as a tax on a corporation doing
business in the state.
43. 340 U.S. at 614 (Clark, J., dissenting). Clark's analysis was employed by two cases
decided in the late 1950's: Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 847 U.S. 359 (1954)
(commonly called and hereinafter cited as Railway 1]; and Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia, 858 U.S. 434 (1959) [commonly called and hereinafter cited as Railway I1].
In Railway I a Virginia annual license tax upon gross receipts earned in the state "on
business passing through, into or out of this State," (VA. CODE §§58-546 to -547 (1950)),
was held unconstitutional as taxing the privilege of carrying on interstate business in the
state.
The Virginia legislature redrafted the statute, and while the amended tax preserved
gross receipts as the measure of the tax, it no longer purported to tax the privilege of
doing business. VA. CODE §§58-546 to -555, as amended by 1956 Va. Acts ch. 612 (repealed
1972 Va. Acts ch. 452). The redrafted statute was challenged in Railway II and upheld by
the Supreme Court, which explained that its decision did not "say that a legislature may
effect a validation of a tax, otherwise unconstitutional, by merely changing its descriptive
words," but that misuse of words can "disable an otherwise constitutional levy." 358 U.S.
at 441.
44. 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (upheld a net income tax based on interstate activities consisting solely of solicitation and delivery of orders).
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from directly levying a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned net income
tax on a business engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. In qualifying
its decision the Court reaffirmed Spcctor;45 thus, the use of interstate commerce
as a measure of a state tax is permitted, but its use as the subject of the tax
is unconstitutional.46 The ruling in Northwestern was heralded as a radical
extension of state power to tax interstate business. Subsequent outcries from
4
the business world forced sympathetic responsive legislation from Congress. 7
Perhaps because of the commotion spawned by the Northwestern decision,
the Court approached the question of state taxation of interstate commerce
with caution over the next fifteen years.48 Nonetheless, through the few cases
that reached the Supreme Court during this period, the power of the state
to tax interstate commerce was broadened as the privilege immunity was
reduced to its narrowest possible construction.49
45. Id. at 458.
46. The Northwestern Court thus gave "constitutional weight to a distinction between
subject and measure which no longer had any economic significance." Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Roadway Express, the Diminishing Privilege Tax Immunity,
and the Movement Toward Uniformity in Apportionment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 186, 187
(1968).
The "subject" represents the legal incidence of a tax. It is the thing or activity on
which the power to tax is based. The "measure" is the yardstick to which the rate is
applied. For a discussion of this area, see Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income
from a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REv. 21, 49-54 (1959).
47. Within seven months after Northwestern, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73
Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §381 (1970)). In defining the minimal intrastate
activities required before a target corporation becomes liable for a state tax, the statute
precludes a tax from being based solely on the solicitation of orders or use of independent
contractors to make sales. For a detailed discussion, see Dane, Small Business Looks at
Public Law 86-272 in the Perspective of Its Alternatives, 46 VA. L. REV. 1190 (1960); Roland,
Public Law 86-272: Regulation or Raid, 46 VA. L. REV. 1172 (1960); Note, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce: Public Law 86-272, 46 VA. L. REV. 297 (1960). For a study of
the judicial problems resulting from this provision, see Note, Public Law 86-272: Legislative
Ambiguities and Judicial Difficulties, 27 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1974).
48. With the exception of the few significant decisions listed below, the Court was
generally reluctant to review cases involving state taxation of interstate commerce: Norfolk
& W.R.R. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968) (held a Missouri ad valorem
property tax imposed on a railroad and measured by a mileage formula to be grossly
disproportionate to interstate activity and therefore unconstitutional); National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (held an Illinois use tax
inapplicable to a mail order firm owning no property and having no in-state employees);
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (upheld a Washington tax measured
by gross receipts from in-state sales as bearing a reasonable relation to in-state activities);
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (upheld a Florida use tax on a Georgia corporation's sales to Florida residents when sales were solicited by part-time Florida wholesalers
and when the Georgia corporation failed to collect the tax from purchasers).
A striking example of the Court's reluctance to become involved in the interstate taxation
controversy was its refusal to give plenary consideration to two state court decisions involving the Kennecott Copper Corporation despite urgings of the Tax Executives Institute,
Inc., the Financial Executives Institute, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce:
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 119, 493 P.2d 632, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 973 (1972); Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App.
3d 496, 95 Cal. Rptr. 805, appcal dismissed, 409 U.S. 973 (1970). Hellerstein, State Taxation
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In the instant case the Supreme Court finally confronted the issue of
immunity from taxation on the privilege of doing business. By rejecting
the immunity granted under the Spector rule, the Court held that a tax on
the privilege of doing business was not unconstitutional on its face.50 The
Court reasoned that not only had "the philosophy underlying the rule been
rejected, but the rule itself ha[d] been stripped of any practical significance." 51
Recognizing no need for what had come to be a "privilege tax pitfall"5 2 for
unwary state legislators, the Court revived the philosophy introduced in
1938 by Western Live Stock: interstate business must "pay its way"53 as long
as the tax is fairly apportioned, 54 nondiscriminatory,5 5 and fairly related to
services provided by the state. 56 If these three requisites are satisfied, the tax
does not violate the commerce clause.57
In eradicating the immunity traditionally enjoyed by businesses engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce, 58 the instant case may appear to have
extended a state's power to tax interstate commerce, a result not inconsistent
with the general trend expanding state taxing powers since the Case of State
Freight Tax.5 9 In fact, however, the Court has not given state legislators any
powers to extract revenues that could not have been collected by alternative
means. 65
of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and

Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. Rav. 149, 154 n.26 (1975).
49. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975), raised the privilege issue
decided almost 25 years earlier in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948),

and it seemed the Court would either revitalize the privilege immunity or discard it
completely by overturning its prior decisions. The Court, however, failed to address this
broader issue and simply drew a semantic distinction between the doing of business in
the corporate form and the bare privilege of doing business. 421 U.S. at 113-14.
50. 97 S.Ct. at 1084.
51. Id. at 1083.
52. Comment, supra note 27, at 855.
53. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
54. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952) (nonapportioned tax on
river traffic held unconstitutional) with Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S.
169 (1949) (tax on barge traffic measured by the number of miles traveled within the state
held to satisfy fair apportionment requirements).
55. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S.Ct. 599 (1977) (N.Y.
transfer tax on securities struck down as unconstitutionally favoring in-state business);
Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952) (held invalid a tax on
privilege of soliciting business that placed a heavier burden on interstate than on intrastate
businesses); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (ruled unconstitutional a tax on peddling
products made out of state but not on those made locally).
56. This requisite is a due process requirement that the business have a sufficient
nexus with the taxing state. The test is whether the taxing power exerted bears a fiscal
relation to protection, opportunities, and benefits given by the state. General Motors Corp.
v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 441 (1964); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 44546 (1940). See generally Barnes, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Nexus and Apportionment, 48 MARQ. L. Rav. 218 (1964); Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of
Interstate Business, 20 TAx. L. REv. 259 (1969).

57.
58.
59.
60.

97 S. Ct. at 1076.
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. at 610.
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873). See note 17 supra for a summary of the case.
"Even though the financial burden on interstate commerce might be the same,
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What the instant case does mark is the Court's final departure from adherence to an abstract constitutional theory that had lost all economic
relevance.6 1 The theory was that engaging in interstate commerce was a
privilege granted by the federal government under the Federal Constitution
and that a state statute purporting to tax the privilege would undermine
federal sovereignty in the regulation of interstate commerce. 2 Undoubtedly,
the revenue due to the states for services rendered could be extracted without
explicitly designating the tax as one on the privilege of doing interstate
business. Thus, a careful phrasing of a new statute or the rephrasing of existing
tax legislation would adequately preserve the sovereignty of this constitutional
privilege and still require businesses to pay their fair share of the tax
burden.63

The redrafting of a statute often occurs only after the statute has been
challenged and invalidated through the judicial process. With the myriad
of decisions64 handed down by the Supreme Court in this area over the past
150 years, it has become apparent that the states will not circumvent the
privilege immunity through self-initiated redrafting of tax legislation. Consequently, the instant Court reasoned that continued adherence to a constitutional objection void of practical benefit must give way to the public's
superior concern for avoiding litigation that neither affects the states' ability
to tax interstate commerce nor deters the use of privilege tax language in
state legislation.65
The most surprising aspect of the instant case was not the holding, but
the unanimity of the Court in reaching the decision. The extent of the states'
power to tax interstate commerce has a long history of judicial controversy
characterized by split decisions.6 6 Unattributable to a shifting Supreme Court
the question whether a state may validly make interstate commerce pay its way depends
first of all upon the constitutional channel through which it attempts to do so .... The
State is not precluded from imposing taxes upon other activities or aspects of this
business which, unlike the privilege of doing interstate business, are subject to the sovereign
power of the State. Those taxes may be imposed although their payment may come out
of the funds derived from petitioner's interstate business..
" Spector Motor Service v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. at 608-09 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the states' jurisdiction
to tax, see Clark, A State's Tax Jurisdiction as Limited by the United States Constitution,
13 U. FLA. L. REV. 401 (1960).
61. Constitutionality was determined by the "incidence of the tax" which had no
bearing on the financial effects of the tax. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340
U.S. at 608.
62. "To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the
state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47,
57 (1891).
63. See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. Virginia [Railway Ii], 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (both cases upheld amended taxes
that had previously been declared unconstitutional). See notes 43 & 49 supra.
64. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
See note 16 supra.
65. 97 S. Ct. at 1083-84.
66. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (5-4 decision);
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (5-1-3 de-
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membership,6 7 this decision shows more than a retreat from the Court's
earlier views; it exemplifies a complete relinquishment of those views.
The confusion resulting from the Court's inability to develop a consistent
and workable approach toward the policing of state taxation of interstate
commerce68 can be attributed partly to Congress's failure to pass legislation
regulating multistate business taxation. Congress was quick to respond to
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 9 in 1959, but apart
from conducting an in-depth study of the field, 70 it has failed to legislate in
an area demanding a greater degree of uniformity than the judicial process
can provide.71 The Court's reluctance to abandon an abstract theory having
a logical basis in the Constitution but having an impractical effect in
application can best be understood in light of the Court's anticipation of
congressional legislation. The Court believed the judicial safeguards thus
cision); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia [Railway 11], 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (6-1-2
decision); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia [Railway 1], 347 U.S. 359 (1954) (5-4
decision); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (6-3 decision);
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 85 (1948) (3-2-4 decision); Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946) (5-1-3 decision); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250 (1938) (6-2 decision). But see Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975)
(5-2-1 decision); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975)
(9-0 decision).
67. The members of the majority that reaffirmed the Spector rule in Colonial Pipeline
Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975) (Burger, C.J., Brennan, Marshall, Powell & White, J.J.)
all participated in the instant majority's rejection of Spector.
68. The great number of cases decided in the area of state taxation of interstate
commerce have been referred to by the Supreme Court over the years as a "quagmire,"
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959), and as
"not always clear . . . consistent or reconcilable. A few have been specifically overruled,
while others no longer fully represent the present state of the law." Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954).
69. 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
70. With the passage of Pub. L. No. 86-272 on September 14, 1959, see note 47
supra, Congress directed a study on state taxation of interstate business, the SPECIAL SU3COMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HousE

COMM.

OF THE JUDICIARY,

H. R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965)
[paginated 1-599, A1-A509, commonly known as the Willis Committee Report]. The study
was the most extensive to date, but its recommendation of remedial legislation in the form
of the Interstate Taxation Act, H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), has not yet become
law. For a discussion of the proposed Interstate Taxation Act, see Celler, The Development
STATE TAXAnON OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE,

of a CongressionalProgramDealing with State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM

L. REv. 385 (1968).
According to the Willis Committee Report, the complexities of determining how to tax
fairly had been beyond the scope of judicial ability and had been a main factor in the
inconsistent approach taken by the Supreme Court. The result was a constant threat of
overtaxation or undertaxation, and the only remedy can come through legislation.
71. Justice Black recognized the dilemma almost forty years ago in his dissent in
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1939): "Judicial control
of national commerce - unlike legislative regulations - must from inherent limitations of
the judicial process treat the subject by the hit-and-miss method of deciding single local
controversies upon evidence and information limited by the narrow rules of litigation.
Spasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation cannot afford an adequate basis for the
creation of integrated national rules which alone can afford the full protection for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution."
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far developed were inadequate or at least beyond the ability of the Court to
apply,72 and was therefore unwilling to erase the immunity protecting interstate businesses. In refusing to eliminate the immunity from privilege taxes,
however, the Court was unfairly restricting states from collecting compensation for services they had provided to interstate business at the expense of
3
intrastate business.7
In view of Congress's failure to legislate, the instant Court has taken the
right step, leaving a three-part test as a skeletal framework for insuring against
state taxation that overly burdens interstate commerce. 74 The past fears that
state tariffs inhibit interstate commerce have been discarded75 and the proper
balance between the states' interests in having interstate business pay for
state services and the public interest in the free flow of commerce at least
appears attainable. By concentrating on the economic effect of the Mississippi
tax rather than on the wording of the statute, the Court has cleared the way
toward a more pragmatic approach to this problem. Nevertheless, congressional
legislation is still needed for the uniformity necessary to relieve the courts
of litigation concerning those questions that the judicial system cannot
6
adequately handle.7
ScoTr SPECHT
72. This is especially evident in the area of apportionment where the most complex
problems have yet to be solved. The complexity explains the Court's reluctance to interfere
with state apportionment formulas over the period between 1920-1960. Then, in the late
1960's, the Court struck down two state apportionment formulas in General Motors Corp.
v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965); and Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Missouri State Tax
Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968), apparently setting standards in this area for the first time
in forty years. See Barnes, supra note 56, at 221; Wanamaker, Supreme Court Limits Authority
of States in Applying Apportionment Formulas, 29 J. TAX 54 (1968); Developments in the
Law -Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. RLEv. 953,
1014 (1962); Comment, supra note 46, at 207-18.
73. The Clark dissent in Spector exposed these inequities: "It has taken eight years
and eight courts to bring this battered litigation to an end. The taxes involved go back
thirteen years. It is therefore no answer to Connecticut and some thirty other states who
have similar tax measures that they can now collect the same revenues by enacting laws
more felicitously drafted. Because of its failure to use the right tag, Connecticut cannot
collect from Spector for the years 1937 to date [1951], and it and other states may well
have past collections taken away and turned into taxpayer bonanzas by suits for refund not
barred by the respective statutes of limitations." 340 U.S. at 614 (Clark, J., dissenting).
74. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
75. See C. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25-27 (2d ed. 1954).
76. The Court has at times called upon Congress to act: "At best, the responsibility
for devising just and productive sources of revenue challenges the wit of legislators." Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.).
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